This paper argues that Aaron Zimmerman’s model of belief implies non-human animals are morally responsible to some extent. Within philosophy, intellectualists consider belief unique to humans while anti-intellectualists like Zimmerman argue in favor of the possibility of animal belief. Of the latter, few consider the potential moral obligations attributed to animals via the capability to believe, which intellectualists could use to dispute Zimmerman on grounds other than descriptive standpoints. Animals face explicit bias, in the form of arguably unfair treatment, from humans in our diet, entertainment practices, and overall relationships. Researching the morality of human and animal behavior might inform how to improve this relationship by reducing bias. To inform this behavior, this paper sides with Zimmerman’s pragmatic approach to belief and Jeff Sebo’s model of moral agency in animals. I use philosophical, psychological, and neurological works to argue no valid reason exists to deny moral agency to animals, and I accept certain premises to argue Zimmerman’s model implies Sebo’s.
Keywords: animal-belief, moral agency, anti-intellectualism, morality
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper looks at how Aaron Zimmerman’s model of belief compares to Jeff Sebo’s model of moral agency. In this research, I compare the compatibility of Zimmerman’s model of belief with Sebo’s model of moral agency in order to look into the moral implications of his model of belief. I argue that no valid reason exists to deny moral agency to animals in Zimmerman’s model. In his book, Belief: A Pragmatic Picture, part of Zimmerman’s motivation to contrast his model with intellectualism is to adhere to a “value of life in all its forms,” by which he means less emphasis on human-centric thinking [1]. One key impact research on animal moral obligation through belief has is commentary on humanity’s relationship with nature. Through researching this relationship, this paper informs the morality of factory farming, zoos, and other industries where our relationship with animals is often a topic of concern [2].
On the question of non-human animal belief, the two main sides are intellectualists and anti-intellectualists [3]. In this paper, I define intellectualism as broadly the stance where belief consists in the knowledge that certain propositions are true or false [4]. Anti-intellectualists deny either the distinction of truth and falsity in a belief and/or the necessity of propositions in belief. The typical intellectualist understands belief to be exclusive to humans given our unique ability to form propositional attitudes, mental states taking a stance on some proposition and of which are based on language. Intellectualists typically limit moral obligation to humans because they do not attribute the ability to reason or believe to animals. Unlike their counterparts, anti-intellectualists can attribute belief to non-human animals, and Zimmerman makes this attribution. For anti-intellectualists like Zimmerman, propositionally-defined belief doesn’t account for intelligent animal behavior he claims to be indicative of belief. His approach to belief is unique in its inclusion of various aspects to the analysis of belief, which I will outline in the following section. Perhaps, the impacts I analyze can be made to similar models.
Sebo’s model for moral agency in Agency and Moral Status is inclusive of anti-intellectualism [5]. The details of this model will be explained in the following section, but in summary it describes two different ways to assign moral agency to a being. Unlike the philosophically traditional way of assigning moral agency to humans, Sebo allows for non-human animals to be attributed moral agency. In this paper I use Sebo’s model to argue that Zimmerman’s model of belief implies limited moral obligations and rights to some non-human animals. My argument relies on premises that Sebo or Zimmerman might support as extensions of their arguments. Sebo’s model is particularly important in the analysis of belief because much of the analysis of moral agency in animals starts off with the assumption they are moral agents. Instead, Sebo looks at the conditions of moral agency in an attempt to account for a growing number of anti-intellectualists who attribute the capability of belief to animals.
This paper is organized into three main sections. In section one, I analyze Zimmerman and Sebo’s models in detail. In section two, I introduce my thesis to compare the two models seen in the previous section and present arguments in favor of it. Zimmerman’s definitions of belief result in certain moral implications when viewed through Sebo’s framework for moral agency In section three, I analyze a possible intellectualist refutation to my thesis and summarize the conclusions of this paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to assign moral responsibility to a being through perceptual agency or propositional agency, Sebo outlines what moral agency is. Moral agency could be thought of as moral responsibility for certain behavior. He also argues for attribution of certain moral rights but only as a result of perceptual moral agency. At the same time, Zimmerman’s model has unanalyzed moral implications. This section outlines these general stances of two different branches of philosophy: one, the requirements for moral agency in Sebo’s model; and two, Zimmerman’s model of belief. In totality, the conditions for moral agency should be considered in relatively broad terms in line with Sebo’s line of reasoning, which supports the idea that animals have some form of moral obligation.
Sebo’s model is composed of two main ways to assign moral agency to something: propositionally and perceptually. To analyze each one, I outline the assumptions they rely upon and the implications for each agency.
Propositional agency is normally looked at as having two necessary and sufficient conditions. One is the control condition, which involves the degree of control or freedom an agent, a being with the capacity to act, has in performing an action. The second, the epistemic condition, regards “whether [an] agent’s epistemic or cognitive state [is] such that she can properly be held accountable for the action and its consequences” [6]. Sebo reduces these two conditions down to one definition for propositional agency: the capacity to act on judgments about reasons for belief, desire, etcetera. This definition creates two conditions for propositional agency: one, the ability to act and two, the ability to reason. To explain these conditions he gives an example: “If you think to yourself, explicitly or implicitly, ‘I should eat a sandwich so that I have enough energy to make it through the afternoon,’ and then you eat a sandwich on the basis of this judgment, then you are thinking and acting as a propositional agent” [7] At the core of propositional agency is the concept of reason, which differentiates it from perceptual agency. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) defines reason as a pattern of thoughts that resolves what to do through reflection. Judgment could also be seen as any conscious mental representation of an object. To argue certain animals can be propositional agents, they must hold second-order beliefs, beliefs about beliefs. These higher level beliefs are also indicative of reason, which requires patterns of thought and reflection. Patterns of thought are defined by SEP as “causal sequences of tokenings of mental representations” [8]. Zimmerman also defines reflection as introspection of occurrent thoughts and mental states as well as “episodic, first-person memories as to what one has thought, felt, and desired in the past” [9]. These definitions become relevant in the next section where I provide examples of how animals fit the criterion for moral agency outlined by these definitions. For example, deception induces false belief in animals and is a way to attribute second-order belief as beings require second-order belief to intentionally deceive [10].
Perceptual agency is the second component to Sebo’s model of moral agency. Perceptual agency is the capacity to act on normative perceptual experiences, which are “memories, anticipations, beliefs, desires, and other psychological dispositions [that] shape perceptual experiences, resulting in viewing objects to be ‘calling out’ to be treated in certain ways and are thereby motivated to treat those objects in those ways” [11]. For example, if you experience a pizza as to-be-eaten, and if you eat a pizza slice on the basis of that perceptual experience alone, then you are acting as a perceptual agent. In this example, you perceived the pizza was calling out to be eaten and acted on this representation. Regular perceptual experiences do not include a “calling out” aspect, instead they are representations of the world around you. Sebo notes how the conditions required for perceptual agency can be fulfilled by animals. Sebo also acknowledges his model implicates perceptual agents as morally responsible “in certain ways” such as worthy of criticism [12].
Sebo also endorses sentientism to conclude life, liberty, and property are rights protected by perceptual agency [13]. I will describe the sentience argument below, but it will be important to define sentience, which is a controversial debate. Because Sebo asserts the necessity for perceptual agency to define sentience, I argue that this type of agency could be used to define sentience [14].
To summarize, Sebo’s model assigns moral obligation via propositional and perceptual agency. Next, I will outline Zimmerman’s model. There are two relevant parts to his model of belief: his definition of belief and his attribution of belief to animals.
To begin, Zimmerman’s idea of relatively attentive and controlled actions as the basis for belief is characteristically pragmatic. For example, Alexander Bain, a key pragmatist, saw belief as “preparedness to act upon what we affirm is admitted on all hands to be the sole, the genuine, the unmistakable criterion of belief” [15]. Assimilation of information also guides behavior similar to that of belief. Assimilated information drives action where although relatively less attentiveness and control guides behavior, the resulting dispositions are equivalent to those that would result from relatively more attentiveness and control. In the end, dispositions are derived from both assimilated information and attentive and controlled behavior.
Zimmerman finds action is “typically an amalgam of movement,” so his stance is functionalist. Functionalism is the view “that what makes something a mental state of a particular type are its actual and potential, or its typical, causal relations to sensory stimulations, behavior, and other mental states.” The final characteristic of Zimmerman’s definition of belief is representationalist [16]. He “equates your beliefs with representations” indicates that part of belief are representations of objects stored in your mind. In all, Zimmerman includes pragmatist, functionalist, and representationalist ideas in his view of belief.
Next, Zimmerman advocates for the attribution of belief to animals. He acknowledges three key points of support on this issue. The first point he notes is the ability of apes, wolves, and dolphins to construct social groups like families which require some understanding or belief regarding the distinct roles and expectations of the other members. Non-verbal communication in the form of reading of behavior, contortment, facial expressions, smells, grunts, gestures, and postures are capacities that achieve this type of organization, and are non-verbal behaviors he compares to language.
The second point noted by Zimmerman is the ability of non-human animals to engage in abductive reasoning, the formation of a conclusion from incomplete information. For example, L. Magnani in Abductive Cognition explains the balance between instinctual and inferential abductive behavior in non-human animals [17]. At least to some extent, as reasoned by Magnani, non-human animals reason though language-like structures through inference, and even lower animals (for example chickens), through their dispositions, shows some level of abductive behavior usually accompanied by pseudo-representations of the external world. The scale of animal belief doesn’t have to be limited to higher levels of animals.
The third point Zimmerman makes is the evidence of non-human animal deception to indicate meta-cogntion, beliefs on the beliefs of others. Such evidence of deception can also range from snapping shrimp and cricket frogs to primates studied by F.B.M de Waal [18]. Zimmerman describes cases of intentional deception as the attempt to induce false beliefs in other beings, a sign of meta-cognition, and a defining characteristic of belief. All three of these points indicate some level of belief in animals per Zimmerman’s definition of belief.
Zimmerman, in creating a broad perspective on belief, doesn’t concede the distinction between non-human animal belief and human belief. Instead, he works to elaborate on similarities these animals have to human processes of belief formation and transmission. For example, the ability for dolphins to innovate then to pass on those innovations down to their children is shown in their gull baiting techniques. In documentation by Carl Safina in 2015, a dolphin named Kelly learned how she could trade dead gulls for fish to eat, so she used fish given to her already to bait gulls to acquire even more fish [19]. She then taught this technique with her child. By improving on learned actions, recognizing them as improvements, and sharing them, Zimmerman draws similarities in belief formation between non-human animal and human behavior.
III. MAIN THESIS DEFENSE
This section analyzes the relationship between the two concepts explained above: Zimmerman’s model of belief and Sebo’s model of moral agency. I use Zimmerman’s definitions in Sebo’s framework for moral agency. My argumentation can be roughly outlined into four main components, propositional agency, perceptual agency, sentientism, and moral obligation. My argument for propositional agency could be outlined as follows:
1a: If a certain animal can intentionally deceive others, then it’s capable of second-order belief.
2a: If an animal can have second-order belief, then it’s capable of reasoning.
3a: If an animal can reason and act, then it’s capable of propositional agency.
4a: Certain animals that have second-order belief are propositional agents.
Conditional 1a implies one further premise: Being a certain kind of animal is sufficient to have a capacity to intentionally deceive. Frans de Waal in 2016 found chimpanzees escaped during the night “only to return to their cage, carefully closing its door behind them before going to sleep” in an apparent attempt to deceive their human caregivers [20]. I argue there was intent to carefully close the door, unlike forms of evolutionary deception like camouflage. Zimmerman’s anti-intellectualism accounts this intentional deception as “attentive” and “controlled” behavior or belief-driven. Similarly, deception itself indicates second-order belief. For example, take de Waal’s observation of Socko, a chimpanzee. “Socko watched [an] assistant hide an apple in a large tractor tire in the outdoor enclosure, while the rest of the colony was kept behind closed doors. Then we released the colony, holding Socko back until last. The first thing he did after coming out the door was to climb onto the tire and peek into it, checking on the apple. He left it alone, though, and nonchalantly walked away from the scene. He waited for more than twenty minutes, until everyone was otherwise occupied, and then went to collect the fruit” [21]. By acting to induce false belief in others, he needed to form the belief that other animals believed there was no apple in the tire. Amy Pollick and de Wall note that communicative patterns are seen in animals ranging from snapping shrimp to frogs, in which intentional deception could exist to an extent [22]. Second-order belief need not be limited to high-level animals, but in many cases, it goes hand-in-hand with reasoned action.
Conditional 2a implies two premises: one, second-order belief is sufficient for the capacity to form patterns of thoughts and two, if an animal is capable of second order belief, it has the capability to reflect. On the first, representational cognition is inherent within Zimmerman’s model of belief. To him, “beliefs are representations that are minimally assimilated within your mind, brain or nervous system” [23]. Representations aren’t limited to humans in his model because animals are capable of belief: “...the wolf mind/brain appears to contain representations of the relevantly unarticulated variety” [24]. It’s important to note that these representations only result from patterns of thought. For example, one can only visualize a mug if one thinks about a mug or certain aspects of it. One cannot visualize a mug without thinking. It intuitively follows, then, that second-order belief implies more complex representations, which in turn require patterns of thought. Zimmerman explains: “Dolphins figure things out for themselves. They represent their ends—e.g. eating fish— and form conjectures as to how these ends might be more easily met. They improve upon entrained practices, recognize these improvements for what they are, and share their innovations with peers and kin” [25]. It seems that patterns of thought go in concert with complex behaviors such as learning and communication in animals that are capable of second-order belief.
On the second premise, animals capable of second-order belief often introspect on memories. Karline Janmaat’s observations of chimpanzee eating habits saw apes “mostly checked trees at which they had eaten in previous years. If they ran into copious ripe fruit, they’d gorge on it while grunting contentedly and make sure to return a couple of days later” [26]. When travelling long distances, they “would get up earlier for trees far from their nests than for those nearby, arriving at about the same time at both.” The access of memories to drive action is a paradigmatic process of reflection, so when they visited locations from their past, they showed signs of reflection. Anthony Dickinson and Nicky Clayton’s study of western scrub jays indicates introspection in non-ape animals too. “The birds were given different items to hide, some perishable (waxworms), others durable (peanuts). Four hours later the jays looked for the worms—their favorite food—before they looked for nuts, but five days later their response was reversed. They didn’t even bother to find the worms, which by that time would have spoiled and become distasteful. They did remember the peanut locations after this long interval, though” [27]. Animals can remember the what, when, and where of certain events. The capacity for animals to form patterns of thought and use memory-driven action culminates in the conclusion that they can reason. In reference to Socko, the chimpanzee, his deception to preserve the apple for himself was likely based on a reasoned account of past encounters. As an adolescent, “he might otherwise have lost his prize” had he not waited. Second-order belief and reason go side by side.
Conditional 3a follows from the conclusions reached in 1a and 2a. In explaining 3a, note the addition of one condition: Being a certain kind of animal is sufficient for the capability of forming judgments. Animals are able to form cognitive representations, so it follows that judgment can be formed as well. If certain animals can form complex judgments about objects and events, they have the underlying cognitive foundation to form judgments about reasons. The difference between these judgments is in its content, so the capacity to make that judgment remains. Certain animals are capable of second-order beliefs. These animals can reason and are, by definition of propositional agency, capable of propositional agency when acting. By 4a animals that have second-order belief, as defined by Zimmerman, are propositional agents when acting. For example, Socko in an attentive and controlled manner made beliefs about what the other chimpanzees believed by engaging in intentional deception. He also reflected on his experience as an adolescent being stolen from by other chimpanzees. Socko would be a propositional agent when he behaves because he has the capability to form second-order belief.
Next, the argument for perceptual agency is outlined as follows:
1b: If a certain animal can have perceptual experiences and the psychological dispositions that shape perceptual
experiences then it’s capable of normative perceptual experiences.
2b: If an animal can have normative perceptual experiences, then it’s capable of perceptual agency.
3b: Certain animals with belief are perceptual agents.
The second part of this section concerns perceptual agency. Conditional 1b has one premise connecting it to Zimmerman’s model: if a certain animal can have belief, then it can also form psychological dispositions and perceptual experiences. Zimmerman concluded animals’ ability to form representations as explained above. Representations go hand-in-hand with perceptual experiences. For example de Waal discusses an experiment where “a macaque watched either a lettuce leaf or a banana being placed under a cup. As soon as the monkey was given access, she ran to the baited cup. If she found the food that she had seen being hidden, everything proceeded smoothly. But if the experimenter had replaced the banana with lettuce, the monkey only stared at the reward. She’d frantically look around, inspecting the location over and over, while angrily shrieking at the sneaky experimenter” [28]. She was guided by a representation of what she had seen and developed an expectation, of which a violation disturbed her. The perceptual experiences that guide animals are cognitive representations they form of the objects and events. When explaining the importance of representations to psychological dispositions, Sebo summarizes Martin Heideggerwho explains that cognitive representations are what differentiate descriptive and normative perceptual experiences. It’s difficult to verify the role of representations in normative experiences, but the “calling out” quality of objects in Sebo’s description can only be attributed by representations. What makes perceptual and propositional agency different are the ways in which behavior is driven. In perceptual agency, a less human-centric limitation defines attentive and controlled behavior. For example, if a cat has the ability to believe as defined by Zimmerman, it can form representations of a fish as to-be-eaten. In a descriptive manner, it can represent the fish as it normally is, and the cat can represent the fish in a normative manner in a to-be-eaten state as a normative perceptual experience.
Conditional 2b follows mainly from the 1b and the definition of perceptual agency. Agency could help to define the normative perceptual experience as well. For example as the cat in the previous example acts in a controlled and attentive manner, representations are formed about the objects and events taking place. These representations are also normative because it’s also acting on them as part of a believing agent. The cat both has representations of a fish as to-be-eaten and eats the fish as part of a believing agent. In a believing agent, normative representational capabilities go in concert with normative perceptual experiences. 3b establishes that certain animals with belief as defined by Zimmerman are perceptual agents. Thus, the cat is also a perceptual agent because of its abilities to form representations through belief.
The third argument of this section supports sentientism as argued for by Sebo, which can be outlined like this:
1c: If a certain animal is sentient, then it has interests.
2c: If an animal has interests, then it’s capable of being harmed
3c: If the animal can be harmed, then moral agents have at least a prima facie moral duty not to harm it.
4c: If moral agents have at least a prima facie moral duty not to harm an animal, then it has at least a prima facie moral right, against these moral agents, not to be harmed.
5c: Animal perceptual agents have a prima facie right to life, liberty, and property.
Conditional 1c connects sentience with interests. For example, suppose a lion experiences her cubs as to-be-protected, and she feels driven to protect her cubs because of this normative perceptual experience. In this scenario, we can say that the lion has an interest in protecting her cubs. Intuitively, it may be that all living things have at least a prima facie interest in life and reproduction from an evolutionary standpoint. Sentient itself is a controversial term, Sebo does not provide a clear definition. Looking at perceptual agency as an outline for sentience may be a way of resolving this issue without involving this paper in that debate.
Conditional 2c connects interest with harm after 1c connected sentience with interest. This statement makes intuitive sense given that harm is when frustration outweighs interest. In our example, the satisfaction of the lion’s interest requires her to stay alive, so she could be harmed if something frustrated this interest. Sebo assumes certain moral goods, life, liberty, and property, are an interest to animals (not just humans) in establishing his sentientism argumentation.
Conditional 3c argues for a prima facie moral obligation to not harm. By using the conclusions reached from 1c and 2c, 3c implies the moral obligation to not harm certain animals that are perceptual agents. In society, laws preventing unjustified murder, assault, and robbery seemingly coincide with this argument. This obligation may have relevance in animals too, though. De Wall in 1996 notes chimpanzees not only assist one another but have a system of revenge to deal with opposition. “To act negatively toward stingy individuals...suggests a sense of justice and fairness” [29]. Chimpanzees seemingly not just acknowledge their moral obligations to not do harm but create rudimentary systems to enforce them as well. In our example of a lion, if she was able to be harmed, other animals such as hyenas might have a prima facie obligation to not harm her.
Conditional 4c established a prima facie obligation in propositional agents who can be harmed to not be harmed. This condition is based heavily on 3c, and can be added upon by 2c and 1c to conclude that certain animals have a moral obligation to not be harmed. Certain laws could exist in our society in correlation with this argument as well. For example, people could have a prima facie moral obligation to not be harmed by murder, assault, and robbery. To continue the example of the lion who has an interest in survival, she has at least a prima facie moral right to life according to sentientism. The loss of her right to life would frustrate her interests, so sentientism can guarantee certain moral rights to non-human animals. As the 5c, all animal perceptual agents have a right to life, liberty, and property by endorsing sentientism even if the agents themselves cannot conceptualize these moral goods [30]. Sebo explains how perceptual agency is sufficient to “having the concept of life, liberty, and property” [31]. These rights are applicable no matter how aware one is of them.
To conclude this section, the final conditional statement is:
1d: If a certain animal is a propositional and/or perceptual agent, then it has certain moral obligations.
The 1d is where non-human animal agents have some level of moral agency, moral obligation. If we take the 4a and the 3b, some animals could fit the conditions of one or both forms of agency. Likely, the attribution of agency is more applicable to higher-order animals like apes rather than animals like snails. There is also the addition of one condition to this doctrine: the need to act. For clarity, moral agency is the responsibility a being takes for their behavior. In discussion of agency, it might be important to note that moral agency applies only to animals that act. Reason alone isn’t the determiner of moral agency because an animal has to act to be considered for moral agency. Animals are not responsible for their thoughts but for their behavior. For example, Paul Shapiro gives two examples of moral agency in animals to humans and to other animals. First, “if [a] human guardian is depressed and the dog understands this yet freely chooses to play with a toy rather than attempting to comfort him, [he] would be inclined to say he is blameworthy.” Second, there is also a sense in which non-human animals may have moral obligations to each other, although Shapiro notes this obligation is relatively rare. “Koko, a sign language-trained gorilla, was given a kitten as a playmate. Not only was Koko able to recognize when the kitten was in distress; she even mourned the cat’s eventual death. Apparently, the relationship between the two was as affectionate as many human-feline relationships, in which the human would undoubtedly have positive obligations to the cat. It does not seem unreasonable to me [Shapiro] to think of Koko as having at least minimal positive obligations to her cat” [32].
This section discussed the arguments in support of propositional agency, perceptual agency, sentientism, and moral agency in animals.
IV. OBJECTIONS
This final section analyzes one main refutation to my argumentation discussed in the above section. One major objection regarding the validity of 2a may be made. Some may argue a being can reason without second order belief.
While this the existence of reason without second order belief is a theoretical possibility, it is not seen in practically. Of the animals we observe to be able to form second-level beliefs, they show the ability to reason. Intentional deception is an indicator of higher level belief, and animals that intentionally deceive show at least some level of introspection in their action. For example, Janmaat’s observations of chimpanzee eating habits saw apes returning to trees with ripe fruit when looking for food. When travelling long distances, they would start their journey earlier for particularly long trips. Chimpanzees’ accessing of memories to drive action indicates some sort of introspective, reflective process in the guidance of behavior. In addition, Dickinson and Clayton’s study of introspection in western scrub jays indicates bird abilities to remember three particular details of an event: what happened, when it happened, and where it happened. The dispositions of these birds suggests some level of reflective, memory-guided, behavior suggesting the ability to reason. At the same time, these birds have been found to engage in deceptive behavior by hiding food to protect it from theft: “the birds use several counter strategies to protect their caches from theft, e.g. hiding most of them out of sight. When observed by potential pilferers at the time of caching, experienced jays that have been thieves themselves, take further protective action” [33]. It seems to be that animals that engage in second-order belief also engage in reasoning even if no a priori relationship exists between these two characteristics.
The second response to this objection regards the role of representations in both belief and reasoning. In belief, representations are a requirement as they constitute the “information-driven” aspect of Zimmerman’s model. Zimmerman argues that animals hold belief, therefore they can also form cognitive representations. Animals such as wolves, chimpanzees, and dolphins show signs of belief and representational thinking to him. Similarly, reflection requires the same cognitive representations that are needed for belief. For example, de Waal explains about a macaque that formed representations about what foods were under certain cups and became frustrated when those representations did not match reality. What is clear, though, is that representations connect reason to second-order belief. Perhaps reflection is the mechanism responsible for why reason and second-order belief are traditionally observed together in animals.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I find that given Aaron Zimmerman and Jeff Sebo’s model, belief attribution to non-human animals has two main implications. One, to reforming the typical notion of moral obligation being unique to humans and two, to attribution of certain moral rights on the basis of perceptual agency. These two conclusions are likely not endorsed by the majority of philosophers studying these subjects, but this paper aims to be the spark for greater discussion on the moral implications on models of belief. In section one, I introduced the main topics this paper analyzed. In section two, I clarified the meanings of key terms such as propositional agency, perceptual agency, sentientism, functionalism, and representationalism. In section three, I connected Zimmerman’s model to Sebo’s model and presented arguments for the premises introduced to make this comparison. In section four, I argued against a possible counter argument by intellectualists. In the end, I conclude that animals may have some limited moral obligation, and some rights, so we should use this analysis to inform our relationships with them.
[1] Aaron Zimmerman, Belief: a Pragmatic Picture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
[2] See more Meehan, Cheryl (2016) in regards to elephant welfare in zoos.
[3] Typically, anti-intellectualism is characterized by a rejection of either or both of two main intellectualist arguments: one, the rejection that belief is propositional, language-based, and second, the rejection that belief is truth-seeking. By rejecting the necessity for language, anti-intellectualists allow for animal belief.
[4] A propositional attitude is typically defined as the mental state of having some attitude, stance, take, or opinion about a proposition or about the potential state of affairs in which that proposition is true (Schwitzgebel 2019). For example, Snikitha wishes that the Green New Deal will be passed through Congress.
[5] Jeff Sebo, “Agency and Moral Status,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 14, no. 1 (2017): pp. 1-22, https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-46810046.
[6] Rudy-Hiller, Fernando, "The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/moral-responsibility-epistemic/>.
[7] Sebo, “Agency and Moral Status.”
[8] See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s “Kant’s Theory of Judgment” and “The Language of Thought Hypothesis.”
[9] Zimmerman, Belief: a Pragmatic Picture, 53.
[10] See more SEP: “The Definition of Lying and Deception”
[11] Sebo, “Agency and Moral Status,” 6.
[12] Ibid.
[13] I side with a wide approach to propositional thought. The wide approach is generally described by Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth who do not view propositional language as necessary for propositional thought.# Instead, they argue non-human animals can think and act propositionally without speaking.
[14] Sebo, “Agency and Moral Status,” 10.
[15] F. C. S. Schiller, “Mr. Bradley, Bain, and Pragmatism,” The Journal of Philosophy Psychology and Scientific Methods, no. Vol. 14, No. 17 (August 16, 1917): pp. 449-457, 450.
[16] Zimmerman, Belief: a Pragmatic Picture, 2.
[17] Lorenzo Magnani, “Abductive Cognition,” Cognitive Systems Monographs, 2009, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03631-6.
[18] A. S. Pollick and F. M. De Waal, “Ape Gestures and Language Evolution,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104, no. 19 (2007): pp. 8184-8189, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0702624104.
[19] Zimmerman, Belief: a Pragmatic Picture, 45.
[20] A. S. Pollick and F. M. De Waal, Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2016), 26.
[21] Ibid., 139.
[22] Pollick and De Waal, “Ape Gestures and Language Evolution.”
[23] Zimmerman, Belief: a Pragmatic, 2.
[24] Ibid., 45.
[25] Ibid., 47.
[26] Pollick and De Waal, Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are?, 141.
[27] Ibid., 72.
[28] Ibid., 139.
[29] Aafke Komter, “The Evolutionary Origins of Human Generosity,” International Sociology 25, no. 3 (2010): pp. 443-464, https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580909360301.
[30] Zimmerman could endorse a wide approach to argue language is not necessary for thought. Thought is necessary for belief, so if language was necessary for though, it would be necessary for belief. His anti-intellectualist stance contrasts this necessity as from Zimmerman’s perspective, animals are capable of thinking.
[31] Sebo, “Agency and Moral Status,” 10
[32] Paul Shapiro, “Moral Agency in Other Animals,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27, no. 4 (December 2006): pp. 357-373, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-006-9010-0, 368-369.
[33] Nicola S. Clayton, Joanna M. Dally, and Nathan J Emery, “Social Cognition by Food-Caching Corvids. The Western Scrub-Jay as a Natural Psychologist,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 362, no. 1480 (2007): pp. 507-522, https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2006.1992.